











Manuscript version: Working paper (or pre-print) 
The version presented here is a Working Paper (or ‘pre-print’) that may be later published 
elsewhere. 
 
Persistent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/161376                            
 
How to cite: 
Please refer to the repository item page, detailed above, for the most recent bibliographic 
citation information. If a published version is known of, the repository item page linked to 
above, will contain details on accessing it. 
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  
 
Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and 
practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before 
being made available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
Please refer to the repository item page, publisher’s statement section, for further 
information. 
 















ISSN 2059-4283 (online) 
ISSN 0083-7350 (print)  
 
Voice and Political Engagement :  
Evidence From a Natural Field Experiment 
 
Anselm Hager, Lukas Hensel, Christopher Roth  
& Andreas Stegmann 
 
(This paper also appears as CAGE Discussion paper 601) 
 
December 2021                      No: 1390 
Voice and Political Engagement: Evidence
From a Natural Field Experiment*
Anselm Hager Lukas Hensel
Christopher Roth Andreas Stegmann
December 17, 2021
Abstract
We conduct a natural field experiment with a major European party to test whether giv-
ing party supporters the opportunity to voice their opinions increases their engagement
in the party’s electoral campaign. In our experiment, the party asked a random subset
of supporters for their opinions on the importance of different topics. Giving supporters
more opportunities to voice their opinions increases their engagement in the campaign as
measured using behavioral data from the party’s smartphone application. Survey data
reveals that our voice treatments also increase other margins of campaign effort as well
as perceived voice. Our evidence highlights that parties can increase their supporters’
investment in the democratic process by implementing policies that increase their voice.
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1 Introduction
Modern democracies’ success relies on political parties which manage to represent their
members’ and voters’ interests. Yet, major established parties have lost a large fraction
of their members (Biezen and Poguntke, 2014). One of the recurring criticisms of main-
stream parties is that they do not pay sufficient attention to their members’ and vot-
ers’ views and interests (Grzymala-Busse, 2019). When members feel that their party is
not interested in their views, they may feel discouraged from engaging and may conse-
quently exit the party (Hirschman, 1970). To counteract such disengagement, political
parties can implement policies aiming to increase their members’ voice.
In this paper, we test whether giving voice to supporters of a major European party af-
fects their engagement in the party’s electoral campaign. In our natural field experiment
the party invites approximately 12,000 supporters to take part in a survey to organise the
upcoming campaign. 964 of these supporters complete the survey. A random subset of
these supporters is assigned to receive the opportunity to share their opinions with the
party. Half of the treated supporters are asked for their opinions on the importance of
different topics for improving the electoral success of the campaign (instrumental voice
treatment), while the other half of the treated supporters are asked for their opinions
on the importance of different topics for them personally (intrinsic voice treatment). To
influence respondents’ perceptions of the credibility of the party’s intentions to take sup-
porters’ views into account, we cross-randomize whether supporters are informed that
they will be provided with feedback in the form of a summary of the survey results
(feedback treatment). To test how these different treatments affect engagement in the
party’s electoral campaign, we employ both survey data on intended participation in
different campaign activities and behavioral data on actual participation in door-to-door
campaigning collected via the party’s smartphone application.
We provide several sets of results about voice and political engagement. First, the
survey data shows that a large fraction of party supporters feel that they are not given
enough opportunities to voice their opinions to the party leadership or that their opin-
ions are not considered. For example, only 24% of supporters state that their opinion is
taken into account in the context of the electoral campaign.
Second, perceptions of being heard by the party are strongly positively associated
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with party supporters’ subsequent willingness to participate in their party’s electoral
campaign, both as measured in a survey and with behavioral data on canvassing. A
one-standard deviation higher index of perceived voice is associated with 0.59 higher
intended number of campaign activities (p < 0.01) and a 1 percentage point higher like-
lihood of participating in the canvassing campaign (p < 0.05), as measured by the app
data.
Third, the natural field experiment reveals that giving supporters the opportunity to
voice their opinions increases their subsequent campaign effort. The voice treatments
increase the likelihood of canvassing by 2.6 percentage points (p < 0.01), which is a large
relative effect size given the low levels of baseline activity measured in the app (with a
control group mean close to zero).1 The effect could reflect either higher actual canvass-
ing activity or higher app usage, both of which are costly contributions to the party’s
campaign. We also uncover increases in intended campaign effort based on survey data.
Party supporters in any of the voice treatments plan to increase the total number of cam-
paign activities, on average, by 0.21 (p < 0.05), corresponding to a 9 percent increase
relative to a 2.42 activities in the control group.
Fourth, we document sizeable, yet non-significant differences in the treatment effects
of the different voice treatments. The treatment effect is most pronounced among sup-
porters who are asked for their opinions on which topics to emphasize to improve the
electoral campaign, with 35% to 44% larger point estimates compared to supporters who
are asked which topics are most important to them personally. The feedback treatment
only has relatively muted and statistically non-significant average effects on engagement
in the campaign.
Fifth, we show that our voice treatments positively impact supporters’ perceptions
of the party’s interest in their views and their level of identification with the party. The
treatment effects are again strongest for supporters exposed to the voice treatment in
which members are offered an opportunity to provide input into the electoral campaign.
At the same time, the voice treatments do not systematically change supporters’ beliefs
about the effectiveness of the party’s electoral campaign strategy. Our findings suggest
1The measured baseline activity may have been modest as campaign activities were unusually low due to
a relatively unpopular main candidate. Moreover, it is likely that not all canvassers used the party’s app to
report their canvassing activities as the app only became available just prior to the beginning of campaign
season.
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that an increase in supporters’ perceived esteem from the party (Akerlof, 2017) is an
important channel through which the voice treatments may have affected engagement.
On the contrary, a change in perceived campaign effectiveness does not seem to explain
the results.
Our paper builds on Hirschman’s seminal work on possible responses to organiza-
tional decline. Hirschman (1970) introduced the idea that facing unsatisfactory perfor-
mance of a private or public sector organization, members of the organization can either
voice their discontent to create improvement, or exit the relationship. We provide direct
causal evidence on the idea that giving voice increases political engagement and may
thus reduce exit from political parties.2 Our findings highlight that even a small inter-
vention can have sizeable effects on engagement in the party’s campaign.
Our findings are relevant for a broad and growing literature concerned with declining
civic engagement. In particular, our study contributes to a literature investigating the
motivation and behavior of political activists such as party supporters (Hager et al., 2019,
2021a,b; Perez-Truglia and Cruces, 2017) and protesters (Acemoglu et al., 2018; Bursztyn
et al., 2021; Cantoni et al., 2017, 2019; Enikolopov et al., 2020a,b; González, 2020; Hager et
al., 2021c; Manacorda and Tesei, 2020; Mcclendon, 2014; Passarelli and Tabellini, 2017).3
We contribute to this literature by providing new evidence on the importance of vertical
relationships between the leadership of a political organization and its members and
supporters. In doing so, our study also draws a connection to recent work on candidate
selection (Casey et al., 2021). While our experiment focuses on giving party supporters an
opportunity to voice their preferences about policy themes, party supporters likely also
appreciate the opportunity to provide input into the leadership’s decisions on candidate
selection. Our evidence highlights that the extent to which the rank and file receive
opportunities to communicate their concerns and preferences to the party leadership has
important implications for their motivation.
Our paper relates to a large literature on incentives in organizations more broadly
(Gibbons, 1998). In recent years, this literature has put particular emphasis on the role
2Our findings relate to work by Trucco et al. (2017) who studies the impact of government responsiveness to
citizens’ complaints about local public goods provision on citizens’ future involvement and engagement using
a field experiment in Buenos Aires.
3Our work is also related to a literature on the persuasive effects of canvassing (Kalla and Broockman, 2017;
Pons, 2018).
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of social incentives in organizations (Ashraf and Bandiera, 2018). Social incentives are
understood as factors that originate from interactions with others and affect workers’
marginal cost or benefit of effort provision. Our paper’s focus on members’ feelings
vis-à-vis the party is most closely related to work by Akerlof and Kranton (2005) who
point out the importance of identity in shaping effort choices in organizations.4 While
voice in organizations has received little attention in political organizations, there is a
growing literature on voice and worker representation in firms (Adhvaryu et al., 2019b;
Harju et al., 2021; Jäger et al., 2021). Adhvaryu et al. (2019b) show that workers quit
when wage increases do not meet their expectations, but enabling voice mitigates this
exit. More broadly, our findings on the mechanisms, which highlight a role for members
being valued by the party, relate to the idea that the extent to which workers feel valued,
is a key determinant of firm performance (Adhvaryu et al., 2019a; Ashraf and Bandiera,
2018; Bandiera et al., 2009; Hoffman and Tadelis, 2021).
Our evidence has implications for the design of vertical relationships and social in-
centives in organizations. Organizations, such as political parties, may be able to increase
their members’ willingness to exert effort by implementing policies that increase their
members’ voice. Our results also provide insights on how creating such opportunities to
voice opinions may be most effective in shaping both perceived agency and eventually
effort choices. Providing members with opportunities to voice their opinion on topics
with high instrumental relevance might be a promising avenue for increasing members’
motivations to contribute to the success of the organisation.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the setting, sample and design. In
Section 3, we present basic descriptive results combining survey data with party records
on engagement. In Section 4, we present the results from the natural field experiment.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Setting and Design
In this Section, we describe the setting, our sampling strategy as well as the design of the
natural field experiment.
4Recent related work sheds light on the role of mission in shaping effort choices in organizations (Cassar
and Meier, 2018; Khan, 2021)
5
2.1 Setting
Our field experiment took place in the run-up to a recent general election in a Western
European country. The experiment was implemented in collaboration with a major po-
litical party to study party supporters’ actual participation in the party’s door-to-door
canvassing campaign as well as other margins of campaign effort. The experimental ma-
nipulation was administered in an online survey sent out, on behalf of the party, roughly
five weeks before the election. After the intervention, we measure intended campaign
effort along several margins, and track party supporters’ real canvassing efforts through-
out the campaign until election day.
Our collaboration partner promoted canvassing as a campaigning tool through inter-
nal communication channels. All canvassing volunteers were instructed to record every
canvassed door in a novel smartphone application as a way to help the party organize
the ongoing as well as future campaigns. The data from the application provide unique
behavioral outcomes on actual canvassing behavior. One caveat to bear in mind is that
usually only a very small fraction of members take part in the canvassing campaign.
2.2 Sampling and Procedures
Our original sample comprises all party supporters who had signed up to the party’s
campaign email list about 5 weeks prior to the election. This list contained around 12,000
party supporters.5 In the first week of the official start of the party’s electoral campaign,
we contacted these supporters with an email invitation on behalf of the party. The email
asked supporters to participate in an online survey to help organize the campaign.6 The
invitation email was designed and sent by the party to preserve the natural environment
and ensure that participants would not be aware of being part of an experiment. A
reminder email was sent seven days later.
In total 1,007 party supporters responded to the online survey for this experiment and
5This list is not identical to the list of party members which is orders of magnitudes larger.
6It is possible that all respondents – irrespective of their treatment status – perceived the email invitation to
participate in an online survey as an increase in their voice within the party. This implies that our estimates
likely constitute lower bounds as individuals in the control group also experienced a potential increase in
perceived voice.
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saw the treatment screen.7 This corresponds to a response rate of 8 percent.8 Random as-
signment to the different treatment conditions and the experimental manipulation took
place within the online survey. The natural field setting mitigates concerns about experi-
menter demand effects (de Quidt et al., 2018) and selection into the study (Harrison and
List, 2004).
Table 1 displays basic characteristics of our sample. 20% of the respondents to our
survey are female. Respondents have an average age of 48 years. 95% of them are actu-
ally members of the party. Party supporters in our sample have been affiliated with the
party for an average of 15.6 years. 78% of the respondents have some experience with
campaign activities, with organizing campaign booths and convincing friends being the
most common activities. 51% report to have previous experience in canvassing.
Pre-registration The analysis was pre-registered at the AsPredicted registry before
the start of the data collection (https://aspredicted.org/v5ec6.pdf).9
2.3 Experimental Design
In this Section we describe the design of the natural field experiment.
2.3.1 Background Characteristics
All party supporters who followed the invitation link to the party’s online survey were
asked a set of questions eliciting basic background characteristics and beliefs. For exam-
ple, we elicit prior experience with different campaign activities and perceived voice in
the party.
7This number falls short of our target sample size from the pre-analysis plan, likely as the party’s main
candidate was relatively unpopular.
8Compared to the population of party members, our final sample is roughly representative in terms of
gender. However, participants in our experiment are substantially younger than the average party member.
The sample for this experiment has also participated more in past electoral campaigns than participants of
previous experiments in the same context.
9Contrary to our expectations, the party only provided us with data on the total number of doors knocked
on during the campaign rather than data on the number of days of activity. As a result, we do not observe the
number of days of canvassing and hence cannot include it in our analyses, as pre-specified. However, in past
data collected via the same canvassing app, the number of days spent canvassing and the number of doors
that a given supporter visited are highly correlated (Hager et al., 2019).
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Table 1: Summary table
Mean SD Median Min. Max. Obs.
Individual level characteristics
Female 0.20 0.40 0.00 0 1 1007
Age 47.51 17.39 48.00 18 77 1007
Party member 0.95 0.22 1.00 0 1 1007
Years of party membership (winsorized) 15.55 15.30 10.00 0 56 1007
Perceived voice within party (1 - 5 Likert scale) 3.19 1.24 3.00 1 5 1007
Prior experience
Any experience campaigning 0.78 0.42 1.00 0 1 1007
Experience: door canvassing 0.51 0.50 1.00 0 1 1007
Experience: # days door canvassing (winsorized) 13.70 32.62 1.00 0 200 1007
Experience: sticking poster 0.62 0.48 1.00 0 1 1007
Experience: campaign booth 0.69 0.46 1.00 0 1 1007
Experience: social media 0.45 0.50 0.00 0 1 1007
Experience: phone canvassing 0.19 0.39 0.00 0 1 1007
Experience: convince friends 0.66 0.47 1.00 0 1 1007
Experience: other 0.13 0.34 0.00 0 1 1007
Post treatment attitudes (control)
I can make a difference through my involvement in [partyname]. 3.37 1.07 4.00 1 5 326
I feel connected to [partyname]. 4.24 0.81 4.00 1 5 326
My opinion is being taken into account to improve the party’s election campaign. 2.75 1.08 3.00 1 5 326
I have the feeling that [partyname] is interested in my opinion. 3.02 1.09 3.00 1 5 326
The [partyname] has an effective campaigning strategy. 2.48 1.10 2.00 1 5 326
Post treatment intentions (control)
# intended activities 2.42 1.77 2.00 0 6 330
Has no plans 0.16 0.37 0.00 0 1 330
Intention: door canvassing 0.31 0.46 0.00 0 1 330
Intention: # days door canvassing 2.24 5.57 0.00 0 35 328
Intention: sticking posters 0.39 0.49 0.00 0 1 330
Intention: campaign booth 0.56 0.50 1.00 0 1 330
Intention: social media 0.47 0.50 0.00 0 1 330
Intention: phone canvassing 0.12 0.33 0.00 0 1 330
Intention: convince friends 0.70 0.46 1.00 0 1 330
Intention: other 0.13 0.34 0.00 0 1 330
Post treatment behavior (control)
Knocked on any door 0.00 0.05 0.00 0 1 335
# doors knocked 0.10 1.75 0.00 0 32 335
Provided comments (all treatment)
Any comment 0.51 0.50 1.00 0 1 672
Nonsense comment 0.02 0.13 0.00 0 1 672
Constructive comment 0.38 0.49 0.00 0 1 672
Comment length 104.52 193.55 7.00 0 1037 672
Notes: Table 1 presents summary statistics of the experimental sample.
2.3.2 Voice Treatments
One third of our respondents proceed straight to the intended campaign activities af-
ter the initial survey block. This group of respondents constitutes the control group.
Two thirds of respondents are assigned to a treatment that was designed to increase
their perceived voice within the party. Half of those are assigned to an “intrinsic voice”
treatment, while the other half are assigned to an “instrumental voice” treatment. We
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designed the experimental treatments in close collaboration with the party to ensure that
the treatments would feel natural to respondents. Figure 1 provides an overview of our
experimental design. We describe these treatment conditions in more detail below.
Intrinsic voice treatment Respondents in the “intrinsic voice” treatment receive the
following set of instructions:
Your opinion is very important to us. We are particularly interested in which
topics are close to your heart. We would therefore like to ask you a few ques-
tions. How much do you personally care about the following issues?
The idea behind the “intrinsic voice” treatment is to provide supporters with an oppor-
tunity to share their opinions about the types of topics they care about.
To elicit these opinions, respondents are initially shown a matrix table listing nine
different topics. These topics are selected based on the main elements of the party’s cam-
paign manifesto and comprised topics ranging from “environment, nature and protect-
ing the climate” to “economy” and “foreign policy and national security”, for instance.
Respondents are then able to indicate how much they personally care about each of these
topics on a 4-point Likert scale. On the subsequent survey page, respondents are then
also given the opportunity to add more thoughts on which topics they personally care
about most via an open text box.
Instrumental voice treatment Respondents in the “instrumental voice” treatment,
on the other hand, receive the following set of instructions:
Your opinion is very important to us. We are particularly interested in which
topics seem important to you based on your experience in your constituency.
We would therefore like to ask you a few questions. Your answers help us to
make the election campaign more effective. What do you think: How much
should we emphasize the following issues in the current national election
campaign?
The idea behind the instrumental voice treatment is to provide supporters with an op-
portunity to express their opinions on how to improve the effectiveness of the electoral
campaign based on their impressions and experiences made in the local constituency.
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This treatment thus provides respondents with an opportunity to express their opinions
to potentially influence a core instrumental concern of the party: achieving success in the
upcoming general election.
The implementation of this treatment closely follows the procedure described above
for the intrinsic voice treatment. Respondents are first asked to indicate which topics the
party should emphasize in the general election campaign based on a matrix table listing
nine different topics.10 Similarly to the intrinsic voice treatment, respondents are then
offered the opportunity to provide further discussion of the topics which they consider
important for the success of the party’s electoral campaign via an open text field.
2.3.3 Feedback Treatment
To credibly signal that supporters’ views are being acknowledged and considered, orga-
nizations may choose to offer supporters feedback on the views they had expressed.11
One way in which such feedback can be provided is by circulating a summary of sup-
porters’ views to all members of the party. With our design, we aim to test the rele-
vance of such feedback by cross-randomizing, among respondents in the voice treat-
ments, whether members are told that they will receive a summary of the survey results.
In particular, respondents in the feedback condition receive the following additional in-
structions once at the introductory text of the voice treatment and then on the survey
page with the open text box:12
After completing the survey, we will send you a summary of the results.
10We hold the topics listed in the table as well as respondents’ answer choices (4-point Likert scale) constant
across both treatment conditions.
11In a laboratory setting, Corgnet and Hernan Gonzalez (2014) study principal-agent interactions in which
the principal has the opportunity to consult the agent. Their results highlight the potentially detrimental effects
of creating the impression that the opinions of lower ranked members of an organization are ignored.
12See Appendix B for the full set of instructions.
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Elicitation: Intended Participation in CampaignElicitation: Intended
Participation in Campaign
Measurement through App:
Actual Participation in Campaign
Measurement through App:
Actual Participation in Campaign
Treatment (N = 673)Control group (N = 334)
End of Survey
Notes: Figure 1 illustrates the experimental design.
2.4 Measures of Campaign Effort
We study the campaign effort of party supporters by combining both behavioral outcome
data on canvassing as well as survey data capturing several effort margins.
Survey based outcomes At the end of the survey, all respondents are asked about
their intentions to contribute to the current election campaign. More precisely, respon-
dents can select all items from a list of activities that they intend to engage in through-
out the electoral campaign. The list includes (i) canvassing, (ii) putting up posters, (iii)
participating in campaign booths, (iv) online advertisements for the party (e.g. sharing
campaign materials on social media), (v) calling supporters, and (vi) talking to family,
friends, and acquaintances about the party’s election program. Moreover, among re-
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spondents who indicate that they plan to canvass, we elicit the intended number of days
of canvassing.13
Post-treatment beliefs Finally, we elicit a range of different beliefs to examine the
extent to which our intervention was successful in changing members’ perceptions of
the party. In particular, we ask respondents to what extent they agree with a number
of different statements. We first measure supporters’ perceived agency in the party by
asking for their agreement with the statement that “[they] can make a difference through
[their] involvement in [partyname]”. Second, we measure the extent to which they think
“[their] opinion matters for improving the campaign strategy”. Third, we elicit supporters’
perception of whether “[they] have the feeling that the party is interested in [their] opinion”.
Fourth, to measure supporters’ identification with the party we measure their agreement
with the statement that “[they] feel connected to the party”. Based on these four questions
we then build an index of voice, which aims to capture the extent to which members
feel heard by their party. As an additional distinct mechanism, we also measure our
respondents’ beliefs about the effectiveness of the party’s campaign strategy.
App data To assess actual behavioral change, we leverage data from the party’s smart-
phone application. Members were encouraged to use the application as it would help to
plan current and future campaign activities. We use the data from the application to
assess several pre-specified behavioral outcomes: first, an indicator for whether a sup-
porter knocks on any doors; second, the number of doors a supporter knocks on (win-
sorized at the 99th percentile).14
Validation Given that our data allows us to link supporters’ survey responses to their
actual canvassing behavior in the field measured via the party’s smartphone application,
we can study how intentions are related to actual canvassing behavior. We find that
people’s intentions to do any canvassing are significantly related to whether they actually
canvass (ρ = 0.19, p < 0.001). Canvassing intentions and behavior are also correlated
when controlling for the full set of control variables (see Online Appendix Table A4).
13The intended number of days for respondents who do not plan to canvass is coded as zero days.
14Individuals who do not appear in the application data are coded as not having canvassed.
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These statistically significant correlations show that intentions are predictive of sub-
sequent actual behavior. However, the fact that that these correlations are far below
one, highlights that self-reported intentions and actual behavior of supporters cannot be
equated. This underscores the need to collect behavioral outcomes in addition to self-
reported intentions.15
2.5 Balance
Appendix Tables A1 shows that the within-survey randomization was generally success-
ful in creating treatment and control groups that do not differ systematically in terms
of observable characteristics. In particular, Appendix Table A1 indicates a significant
difference between respondents in the control group and those respondents that were
randomly assigned to any of the four different voice treatments only in terms of the ex-
pected vote share for supporters’ own party (significant at the 10% level). The observed
differences are consistent with chance given a comparison in terms of 17 observed di-
mensions.16
3 Descriptive Evidence on Voice
In this Section, we provide descriptive evidence on voice. First, we characterize the ex-
tent to which members feel heard by the party. Second, we examine associations between
voice and measures of campaign effort.
3.1 Descriptive Facts about Voice
We use two measures of perceived voice to investigate the fraction of supporters feeling
that they are not heard by the party. First, we asked respondents directly whether they
are feeling heard by the party as part of the set of basic questions administered to all
15In practice, there is a fraction of canvassers that does not report the door-to-door activity in the app. This,
in turn, should result in attenuation bias of the estimated strength of the relationship between the intended
participation in the campaign and actual participation as measured with the app data.
16In Online Appendix Table A2 we show a balance table for the type of voice component of the treatment.
The instrumental and intrinsic type of voice only significantly differ on the fraction of supporters that are
members of the party and none of the other dimensions. Similarly, we only observe one significant difference
between the voice treatments with and without feedback (Online Appendix Table A3).
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respondents. Second, we construct a voice index based on the four post-treatment beliefs
described in section 2.4.
Figure 2 highlights substantial heterogeneity in the extent to which people feel that
their views are heard based on the pre-treatment distribution of perceived voice. 32% of
members feel that they are “definitely not” or “rather not” heard within the party. 22%
of members are unsure, while the remaining 45% of members feel that they are rather or
















No, definitely not Rather not I am not sure Rather yes Yes, definitely
Do you feel that your opinion is heard within the party?
Figure 2: Distribution of perceived voice prior to treatment
Appendix Figure A1 describes the correlates of these two measures of perceived
voice. The only predictor of voice across both measures is the vote share that support-
ers expect their own party to obtain. For both voice measures, a one standard deviation
increase in this expectation is associated with 0.25 and 0.29 standard deviations more
perceived voice (p < 0.01), respectively. Demographic characteristics and party mem-
bership are generally not significantly related to perceived voice in a consistent manner.
Open-ended responses Party supporters’ opinions which they were able to provide
in an open text box indicate that a substantial fraction of party supporters experience
14
high demand for voice.17 Table 1 illustrates that 51 percent of supporters give voluntary
input when offered the opportunity to share their opinions via a open-ended text box.
Moreover, 36 percent of these party supporters provide constructive input. The most
commonly mentioned topics are related to the general campaign strategy, the topics that
should be emphasized more heavily in the campaign, and the party’s candidate selection
decisions. Overall, the open-ended data thus suggests both a high engagement of survey
participants and a significant demand for voice.
3.2 Association between Voice and Engagement
Our post-treatment measure of voice is strongly correlated with both campaign inten-
tions and actual canvassing behavior.18 Panel A of Figure 3 shows an almost linear,
positive relationship between the voice index and the number of activities that support-
ers report to intend to engage in throughout the electoral campaign. A one standard
deviation increase in the voice index is associated with 0.59 more intended activities
(p < 0.001). Panel B of Figure 3 shows the same correlation for actual canvassing behav-
ior. The correlation is also positive with a one standard deviation increase in the index
being, on average, associated with a one percentage point increase of canvassing activity.
However, this association appears to be strongest for individuals in the top decile of the
voice index. These correlations raise the question whether an increase in party support-
ers’ perceived voice can causally influence different dimensions of their campaign effort.
We turn to the results from the natural field experiment to address this question in the
next section.
17We observe this open-ended data for respondents in any of the voice treatments, but not for respondents
in the control group.
18Note that we use the post-treatment voice index and the entire sample for this exercise due to the low level
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Figure 3: Relationships between voice and canvassing behavior
Notes: Figure 3 shows binscatter plots of the post-treatment voice index and campaign intentions and behavior
in the full sample. Data is divided in decile bins. Panel A shows the relationship between the voice index
and the number of intended campaign activities. Panel B shows the relationship between the voice index and
whether individuals conducted any canvassing according to the app data.
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4 Results from the Natural Field Experiment
In this Section, we present the results from the natural field experiment. We first present
the main results on the app data, intended campaign activities and then explore mecha-
nisms based on the survey data.
4.1 Empirical Specification
We begin by estimating the effect of being exposed to any voice treatment. To maximize
statistical power, we pool across all cross-randomized treatment arms.19 In particular,
we use the following specification:
Yi = β0 + β1treatment
pooled
i + βXi + ε i
where Yi is the outcome of interest and treatment
pooled
i is an indicator for receiving any
voice treatment. Xi includes all available control variables: age, gender, party member-
ship dummy, years of party membership, high perceived prior voice dummy, campaign
experience (dummies for all past activities in which a supporter states to have engaged
in previously), and z-scored expected vote shares for the own party and the two main
competitors. We display robust standard errors throughout.
We also examine whether the type of voice provided to supporters matters for their
subsequent engagement in the political campaign. To estimate the effects of the intrinsic
and instrumental voice treatments, we use the following specification:
Yi = δ0 + δ1treatmentinstrumentali + δ2treatment
intrinsic
i + δXi + ε i
where treatmentinstrumentali is a dummy indicating whether the voice treatment was pro-
vided in instrumental terms and treatmentintrinsici is a dummy indicating whether the
voice treatment was provided in intrinsic terms. To investigate whether the effect of the
instrumental version of the voice treatment differs from the effect of the intrinsic voice
treatment, we directly test δ1 = δ2. We use an analogous version of this specification to
estimate the effects of the voice treatments with and without feedback.20
19As specified in the pre-analysis plan, we also explore disaggregated effects of the different voice treatments
below.
20We display fully disaggregated results in section A.1 of the Online Appendix.
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4.2 Behavioral Outcome Data on Canvassing
We first examine the effect of being in any voice treatment on actual canvassing behavior.
The estimates from the natural field experiment reveal that receiving any voice treatment
significantly increases respondents’ canvassing activity as measured through the party’s
smartphone application. The treatment increases individuals’ propensity to canvass by
2.6 percentage points and the average number of doors canvassed by 1.2 (both p < 0.01;
Panel A of Table 2).21 While these effects are relatively small in absolute terms, they are
large given the low level of recorded canvassing activity in the control group (which is
close to zero). The modest levels of engagement in the campaign could be a result of
relatively low levels of popularity of the main candidate, but may also reflect that not all
canvassers report their canvassing in the app. To the extent that there is under-reporting
of canvassing uniformly across treatment arms, this would only result in an attenuation
of treatment effects.
The results in Panel B of Table 2 indicate that the effects are particularly pronounced
for party supporters in the instrumental voice treatment. The treatment effect on any
canvassing and the number of canvassed doors are both about 50% larger for supporters
in the instrumental voice treatment than for supporters in the intrinsic voice treatment
(columns (1) and (2) in Panel B of Table 2). However, despite the large relative difference
in treatment effects, the instrumental voice treatment and the intrinsic voice treatment are
not significantly different from each other as a result of limited statistical power (p = 0.49
and p = 0.53, respectively).
In Panel C of Table 2, we examine the effects of the voice treatment with and without
feedback on supporters’ engagement. We find no differential impact on canvassing be-
havior of the feedback treatment. While the point estimates tend to be somewhat larger
for respondents from the feedback treatment, we are unable to reject any of the tests of
equality of the two coefficients.
Given the observed treatment effects on real canvassing behavior, it is possible that
receiving the opportunity to voice their opinions also affected other dimensions of sup-
porters’ intended campaign effort. We explore this possibility in the next subsection.
21Estimating the specification without control variables does not change the magnitude or significance of the
results substantially. The results on the extensive canvassing margin are also robust to not using control vari-
ables and to estimating non-linear Logit regressions instead of linear regressions with OLS (Online Appendix
Tables A6 and A5, respectively).
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Table 2: Main treatment effects
App data Survey data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Any Doors (wins) # intended activities Voice index (z)
Panel A: Main effects
Any voice treatment 0.026∗∗∗ 1.207∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗ 0.082
(0.007) (0.352) (0.103) (0.058)
Panel B: Type of voice
Instrumental 0.030∗∗∗ 1.424∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗ 0.134∗∗
(0.010) (0.523) (0.117) (0.066)
Intrinsic 0.021∗∗ 0.990∗∗ 0.178 0.030
(0.009) (0.462) (0.119) (0.065)
p(Instrumental = Intrinsic) 0.49 0.53 0.59 0.09
Panel C: Feedback announcement
Feedback announcement 0.025∗∗ 1.360∗∗ 0.277∗∗ 0.116∗
(0.010) (0.541) (0.118) (0.067)
No feedback announcement 0.027∗∗∗ 1.057∗∗ 0.145 0.050
(0.009) (0.439) (0.117) (0.064)
p(Feedback = No feedback) 0.88 0.66 0.25 0.28
Control mean 0.00 0.10 2.42 -0.00
Number of Observations 1007 1007 964 955
Notes: Table 2 presents the main treatment effects with control variables. Panel A displays pooled treatment
effects. Panel B displays heterogeneity by type of voice. Panel C displays heterogeneity by whether supporters
saw the feedback announcement. Columns (1) and (2) show treatment effects on canvassing behavior mea-
sured using the smartphone application. Column (3) shows the impact on the number of planned campaign
activities. Column (4) shows the impact on the voice index measured through the survey. All specifications
include the following control variables: age, gender, membership dummy, years of party membership, above
median perceived voice dummy, campaign experience (dummies for all past activities), and z-scored expecta-
tions for the vote shares of the own party and the two main competitors. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
4.3 Number of Intended Campaign Activities
Next, we examine the effects of the voice interventions on the overall number of intended
campaign activities. While we only observe behavioral outcomes for canvassing, we ask
individuals about their intentions to participate in a range of other campaign-related ac-
tivities. Column (3) of Table 2 displays the treatment effect on the number of intended
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campaign activities. We find that the intervention increases the intended number of ac-
tivities by 0.21 (p < 0.05), on average. This corresponds to an increase in the number
of activities by approximately nine percent compared to a control group mean of 2.4 ac-
tivities. This suggests that supporters broadly increased their intended campaign effort
across a range of dimensions.
Columns (2) to (8) in Panel A of Appendix Table A7 decompose this effect by exam-
ining treatment effects on supporters’ intentions to engage in a wide range of campaign
activities. The effects on canvassing intentions (measured both at the extensive and the
intensive margin) are positive with effect sizes mimicking those on observed, real can-
vassing behavior. However, due to higher control group means these are not statistically
significant as the standard deviation of the outcomes are much smaller in the app data.
We observe the largest treatment effects on supporters’ intentions to participate in cam-
paign booths and to convince friends and family members, with increases of 5.7 and 5.4
percentage points, respectively (both p < 0.10).
In Panel B of Table 2, we show that the treatment effects on intended campaign ac-
tivities tend to be somewhat larger for the instrumental voice treatment. However, the
difference in estimated treatment effects between the instrumental and intrinsic voice
treatments are never significantly different because of limited statistical power.
In Panel C of Table 2, we find that the treatment effect on the number of intended
campaign activities is somewhat larger in the presence of the feedback treatment (β =
0.28 vs β = 0.15), yet the difference is not significantly different (p = 0.25). Similarly,
Appendix Table A7 shows that there are no significant differences between the voice
treatment with and without feedback on supporters’ intentions to participate in any of
the different campaign activities.
Overall, our results suggest that the voice treatments increased supporters’ willing-
ness to participate and exert effort in multiple campaign dimensions beyond canvassing.
Reconciling effect sizes While the absolute effect sizes on canvassing intentions and
behavior are comparable (close to approximately 2 percentage points), the relative effect
sizes are much larger in the app data than in the survey data. One potential explanation
for this finding is the presence of heterogeneous treatment effects. If treatment effects
are stronger for respondents who are more inclined to engage in the party’s campaign
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based on their predetermined characteristics, and if participating in campaign activities
is sufficiently costly (relative to simply stating the intention to participate), we may ex-
pect differences in effect sizes between survey-based intentions and actual behavior. In
particular, we might observe higher levels of intended engagement, but not actual partic-
ipation for the control group, while treated individuals with comparable characteristics
are actually more likely to follow through with their intentions. This scenario is con-
sistent to the observed pattern of relatively similar absolute treatment effect sizes and
smaller relative effect sizes on supporters’ intentions (when compared to the relative ef-
fect size on supporters’ actual behavior). Indeed, we provide evidence in Section 4.6 that
treatment effects for the app data and perceived voice are more pronounced for support-
ers with stronger pre-treatment perceived voice, i.e. supporters that are more likely to
canvass to begin with.
The differences in effect sizes between the survey and app data can also be inter-
preted through the lens of the intention-behavior gap, i.e. people’s failure to act on their
intentions (Sheeran and Webb, 2016). The correlation between intentions and behavior
is indeed significantly higher in the treatment group compared to the control group (Ta-
ble A8). This is consistent with the idea that perceived voice is a potential determinant
of whether supporters manage to translate their intended campaign effort into actual
(costly) behavior. Alternatively, the difference could also reflect differential willingness
to report canvassing activities in the party’s smartphone app. Given that usage of the
app was encouraged by the party and that it is costly to participants to use the app, we
view this as a different form of costly effort.
4.4 Mechanisms: Impact on Respondents’ Perceptions
To shed light on potential mechanisms through which the voice treatments may affect
campaigning effort, we examine treatment effects on an index of perceived voice and
its individual components, as well as the perceived effectiveness of the campaign. The
voice index captures the extent to which party members feel valued by the party lead-
ership and the extent to which members identify with the party (Akerlof and Kranton,
2005). This measure relates to a behavioral explanation for the observed increase in party
supporters’ engagement in response to the opportunity to voice their opinion: the psy-
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chological utility party supporters receive from a better relationship with the party lead-
ership (and vice versa the psychological utility cost party supporters may experience
when they feel disconnected from the party and/or not valued by the party leadership).
This type of psychological utility may reduce supporters’ marginal cost of engaging in
campaign-related activities. This potential explanation relates to work on social incen-
tives in organizations (Ashraf and Bandiera, 2018).
In contrast to the above behavioral channel captured by the voice index, we also con-
sider a more standard channel to explain party supporters’ change in behavior: the voice
treatments may impact supporters’ marginal cost of effort by influencing supporters’ be-
liefs about the effectiveness of the party’s electoral campaign. This alternative channel
is based on supporters’ consequential motives and instrumental concerns. We measure
these by eliciting supporters’ perceived effectiveness of the campaign. This potential
channel is closely related to the original ideas put forth by Hirschman (1970).
Voice Index Column (4) in Panel A of Table 2 presents the results of the pooled treat-
ment effect analysis. The estimated effects on the voice index are positive but insignifi-
cant after controlling for pre-determined variables (β = 0.082, p = 0.16).
While the average effects are not significant, Panel B of Table 2 shows that there is
indeed a larger impact on supporters’ perceived voice in case of the instrumental voice
treatment (column (4) of Table 2). The treatment effect for the voice index is 0.13 standard
deviations for the instrumental version and only 0.03 standard deviations for the intrinsic
version of the voice treatment. This difference is significant at the 10% level. Panel C of
Table 2 examines heterogeneity in the effects by feedback. Column 4 of Table 2 shows
that the feedback treatment caused a significant increase in the voice index (β = 0.12,
p < 0.1) while the impact of the voice treatment without feedback is not significant
(β = 0.05, p = 0.41). The difference is not significantly different (p = 0.29).
Disaggregated Outcomes in the Voice Index Panel B of Appendix Table A9 shows
that such differences between the effects of the intrinsic and instrumental voice treat-
ments also exist for two of the four index components, particularly on supporters’ feel-
ing of being heard in the party and supporters’ perceived interest of the party in their
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opinion.22 This in turn suggests a potential role for mechanisms related to esteem and
identity as drivers of treatment effects.
Overall, these results suggest that explicitly linking the elicitation of voice to an issue
of high instrumental relevance, in our context to the objective to improve the effective-
ness of the party’s electoral campaign, can increase perceived voice.
Perceived Effectiveness of the Campaign We further test whether the treatment
changed individuals’ perceptions of the effectiveness of the party’s campaign strategy,
which could have affected supporters’ decisions to exert effort during the campaign. It
is conceivable that supporters believe that the fact that the party is eliciting feedback on
topics to highlight during the electoral campaign or even information about support-
ers’ personal preferences increases the overall quality and, hence, effectiveness of the
campaign. However, our empirical analysis reveals an insignificant treatment effect on
beliefs about campaign effectiveness of -0.07 standard deviations (Online Appendix Ta-
ble A10). Similarly, the treatment effects of the instrumental and intrinsic version of the
voice treatment are both negative, small, and insignificant (Panel B of Online Appendix
Table A10). Taken together, this suggests that the observed effects on campaign behav-
ior are not driven by an increase in the perceived effectiveness of the party’s campaign
strategy.
4.5 Mechanisms: Text data on voiced opinions
In this section, we analyze treatment effects on the text data consisting of the opinions
party supporters voice in the open text box.
Measurement and coding We measure the voluntary provision of information through
the text provided by supporters using the open text field which was part of all voice
treatment conditions. Our main outcomes are a dummy taking value one if a respondent
made any comment, a dummy taking value one if a nonsensical comment was provided,
a dummy taking value one if a respondent made a constructive comment, and finally the
22Differences in treatment effects exhibit a similar pattern for the other two components of the index, but the
differences are not significant.
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length of the written text as measured by the number of characters winsorized at the 99th
percentile).23
Specification Empirically, we estimate the following equation among all respondents
who received any voice treatment:24
Yi = φ0 + φ1treatment
type
i + φXi + ε i (1)
where Yi is either dummy whether a (specific type of) comment was provided or the
length of the comment provided, and where treatmenttypei is a dummy indicating whether
the supporter received a specific type of the voice treatment (either the instrumental ver-
sion of the voice treatment or a voice treatment with an announcement of feedback).
Results Table 3 shows the treatment effects of the instrumental treatment (Panel A)
and the feedback treatment (Panel B). The Table highlights that neither the instrumental
treatment nor the feedback treatment affect the likelihood of making any comment or
making a constructive comment. Respondents in the instrumental treatment are 2 per-
centage points less likely to make a nonsense comment (p < 0.05), compared to a mean of
3 percent in the intrinsic voice treatment group. Moreover, anticipated feedback increases
the length of the written text. Supporters that were randomly assigned to the feedback
condition write, on average, 33 characters more compared to respondents in a treatment
condition that did not include a feedback announcement (p < 0.05). This suggests that
the anticipation of feedback may help increase information flows in organizations by en-
couraging the rank and file to increase their willingness to share suggestions with the
party leadership.
23All of our results are robust, but estimated less precisely if we do not apply the winsorization.
24We cannot include supporters in the control group in this analysis as they were not given the opportunity
to share their views.
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Table 3: Effect of feedback on provided information
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Any comment Nonsense comment Constructive comment Length (characters)
Panel A: Type of voice
Instrumental 0.008 -0.020∗∗ 0.026 10.895
(0.037) (0.009) (0.037) (14.092)
Intrinsic group mean 0.50 0.03 0.36 98.16
Panel B: Feedback announcement
Feedback announcement 0.022 -0.005 0.006 32.604∗∗
(0.037) (0.009) (0.036) (13.645)
No feedback group mean 0.50 0.02 0.38 85.19
Number of Observations 672 672 672 672
Notes: Table 3 presents treatment effects on the extensive and intensive margins of provided comments. Panel
A shows the effects of type of voice. Panel B shows the effects of the feedback announcement. The pure
control group is not included as they were not asked for comments. Length of comment is winsorized at the
99th percentile. All specifications include the following control variables: age, gender, membership dummy,
years of party membership, above median perceived voice dummy, campaign experience (dummies for all
past activities), and z-scored expectations for the vote shares of the own party and the two main competitors.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
4.6 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
Finally, we examine heterogeneous treatment effects by members’ perceived pre-treatment
voice. Figure A2 shows the treatment effects on the app data (Panel A) and the voice in-
dex (Panel B) separately for respondents with above and below median pre-treatment
voice. The figure highlights that treatment effects are more pronounced for respon-
dents with above-median pre-treatment voice. These results suggest that a relatively
light touch intervention might be most effective in influencing the behavior of party sup-
porters who already perceive higher levels of voice and are potentially more marginal to
participate in the campaign to begin with.
5 Conclusion
We conduct a natural field experiment with a major European party to test whether giv-
ing voice to party members increases their subsequent engagement in the party’s cam-
paign. In our experiment, the party provides a random subset of party supporters the
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opportunity to voice their opinions. We show that giving more opportunities for sup-
porters to voice their opinion increases their engagement in the campaign as measured
using behavioral data from the party’s smartphone app. Survey data reveals that our
voice treatment increases other margins of intended campaign effort. Finally, our survey
data also suggests that our treatment effects operate through members’ increased per-
ceived voice and agency within the party rather than through increases in the perceived
effectiveness of the campaign.
Our evidence has far-reaching implications for the design of vertical relationships
in political organizations. Our results suggest that political parties can increase their
members’ willingness to exert effort for the organization by implementing policies that
increase their voice. Future research which tests the effects of more heavy-handed or
repeated interventions will help provide further important insights for the design of ver-
tical relationships in organizations. Future work also needs to consider how the dynamic
effects of voice depend on an organization’s responsiveness to voiced opinions. Finally,
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A Appendix Tables
Table A1: Pooled balance table
Control Treatment ∆ p(∆ = 0)
Individual level characteristics
Female 0.21 0.20 -0.01 0.68
Age 48.10 47.21 -0.89 0.44
Party member 0.94 0.95 0.01 0.49
Years of party membership (winsorized) 15.12 15.76 0.64 0.53
Perceived voice within party (1 - 5 Likert scale) 3.11 3.23 0.12 0.15
Expected vote share own party (z) 0.01 -0.11 -0.12 0.06
Expected vote share competitor party 1 (z) -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.91
Expected vote share competitor party 2 (z) 0.00 -0.04 -0.05 0.51
Prior experience
Any experience campaigning 0.77 0.78 0.01 0.85
Experience: door canvassing 0.49 0.52 0.03 0.42
Experience: # days door canvassing (winsorized) 13.79 13.65 -0.13 0.95
Experience: sticking poster 0.59 0.64 0.04 0.19
Experience: campaign booth 0.70 0.69 -0.02 0.61
Experience: social media 0.42 0.47 0.05 0.11
Experience: phone canvassing 0.19 0.19 0.01 0.75
Experience: convince friends 0.67 0.66 -0.01 0.77
Experience: other 0.12 0.14 0.02 0.47
Notes: Table A1 presents a balance table for the pooled treatment variable. P-value of the joint test of insignifi-
cance is 0.21.
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Table A2: Balance table by instrumental treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Control Instrumental Intrinsic p(Inst=Cont) p(Intr=Cont) p(Intr=Inst)
Individual level characteristics
Female 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.73 0.72 0.98
Age 48.10 48.38 46.03 0.84 0.13 0.08
Party member 0.94 0.97 0.93 0.03 0.53 0.01
Years of party membership (winsorized) 15.12 15.82 15.71 0.55 0.62 0.93
Perceived voice within party (1 - 5 Likert scale) 3.11 3.20 3.27 0.39 0.10 0.44
Expected vote share own party (z) 0.01 -0.09 -0.14 0.20 0.04 0.43
Expected vote share competitor party 1 (z) -0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.70 0.88 0.58
Expected vote share competitor party 2 (z) 0.00 -0.11 0.02 0.15 0.83 0.11
Prior experience
Any experience campaigning 0.77 0.79 0.77 0.67 0.91 0.59
Experience: door canvassing 0.49 0.52 0.52 0.47 0.51 0.94
Experience: # days door canvassing (winsorized) 13.79 11.54 15.78 0.36 0.46 0.08
Experience: sticking poster 0.59 0.66 0.61 0.07 0.66 0.16
Experience: campaign booth 0.70 0.70 0.68 0.86 0.49 0.60
Experience: social media 0.42 0.49 0.45 0.07 0.37 0.35
Experience: phone canvassing 0.19 0.18 0.21 0.80 0.43 0.29
Experience: convince friends 0.67 0.67 0.65 0.94 0.55 0.50
Experience: other 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.28 0.89 0.34
Notes: Table A2 presents a balance table by type of voice.
Table A3: Balance table by feedback treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Control Feedback No feedback p(Feed=Cont) p(No Feed=Cont) p(Feed=No Feed)
Individual level characteristics
Female 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.85 0.60 0.74
Age 48.10 47.19 47.23 0.50 0.51 0.98
Party member 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.52 0.57 0.94
Years of party membership (winsorized) 15.12 16.64 14.92 0.20 0.86 0.15
Perceived voice within party (1 - 5 Likert scale) 3.11 3.24 3.23 0.19 0.24 0.88
Expected vote share own party (z) 0.01 -0.13 -0.10 0.08 0.11 0.75
Expected vote share competitor party 1 (z) -0.00 -0.03 0.04 0.69 0.60 0.33
Expected vote share competitor party 2 (z) 0.00 -0.09 0.00 0.23 1.00 0.23
Prior experience
Any experience campaigning 0.77 0.80 0.75 0.35 0.57 0.13
Experience: door canvassing 0.49 0.55 0.49 0.15 0.97 0.14
Experience: # days door canvassing (winsorized) 13.79 14.57 12.77 0.76 0.69 0.46
Experience: sticking poster 0.59 0.65 0.62 0.11 0.49 0.35
Experience: campaign booth 0.70 0.73 0.65 0.46 0.12 0.02
Experience: social media 0.42 0.46 0.48 0.24 0.12 0.74
Experience: phone canvassing 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.77 0.79 0.97
Experience: convince friends 0.67 0.69 0.63 0.60 0.31 0.12
Experience: other 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.44 0.63 0.77
Notes: Table A3 presents a balance table by feedback announcement.
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Table A4: Correlation between canvassing intentions and actual canvassing
Any door Doors (wins)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intention: Any canvassing 0.057∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 2.967∗∗∗ 2.646∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.014) (0.751) (0.735)
Control mean 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.10
Number of Observations 964 964 964 964
Control variables X X
Notes: Table A4 presents the correlations between a dummy indicating any canvassing intention and observed
canvassing behavior. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A5: Treatment effect on any doors: Logit estimation
Any canvassing (app data)
(1) (2)
Panel A: Main effects
Any voice treatment 2.327∗∗ 2.359∗∗
(1.027) (1.106)
Marginal effect 0.030 0.033





Marginal effect: Instrumental 0.100 0.092
Marginal effect: Intrinsic 0.098 0.077
p(Instrumental = Intrinsic) 0.67 0.37
Panel C: Feedback announcement
Feedback 2.345∗∗ 2.339∗∗
(1.052) (1.145)
No feedback 2.309∗∗ 2.379∗∗
(1.052) (1.117)
Marginal effect: Instrumental 0.101 0.083
Marginal effect: Intrinsic 0.098 0.086
p(Feedback = No feedback) 0.94 0.93
Control mean 0.00 0.00
Number of Observations 1007 1007
Controls X
Notes: Table A5 presents the main treatment effects estimated using logit regressions. Panel A displays pooled
treatment effects. Panel B displays heterogeneity by type of voice. Panel C displays heterogeneity by whether
supporters saw the feedback announcement. The table displays logit coefficients and marginal effects. ∗ p <
0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A6: Main treatment effects without control variables
App data Survey data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Any Doors (wins) # intended activities Voice index (z)
Panel A: Main effects
Any voice treatment 0.027∗∗∗ 1.288∗∗∗ 0.327∗∗∗ 0.120∗
(0.007) (0.362) (0.119) (0.068)
Panel B: Type of voice
Instrumental 0.030∗∗∗ 1.425∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗
(0.010) (0.520) (0.138) (0.078)
Intrinsic 0.024∗∗ 1.150∗∗ 0.265∗ 0.062
(0.009) (0.485) (0.137) (0.079)
p(Instrumental = Intrinsic) 0.67 0.69 0.37 0.15
Panel C: Feedback announcement
Feedback announcement 0.027∗∗∗ 1.486∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.145∗
(0.010) (0.550) (0.138) (0.079)
No feedback announcement 0.026∗∗∗ 1.097∗∗ 0.258∗ 0.096
(0.010) (0.455) (0.137) (0.078)
p(Feedback = No feedback) 0.94 0.58 0.30 0.54
Control mean 0.00 0.10 2.42 -0.00
Number of Observations 1007 1007 964 955
Notes: Table A6 presents the main treatment effects without control variables. Panel A displays pooled treat-
ment effects. Panel B displays heterogeneity by type of voice. Panel C displays heterogeneity by whether
supporters saw the feedback announcement. Columns (1) and (2) show treatment effects on canvassing be-
havior measured using the smartphone application. Column (3) shows the impact on the number of planned
campaign activities. Column (4) shows the impact on the voice index measured through the survey. All speci-
fications do not include control variables. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A7: Treatment effects on overall campaign activity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
# activities Campaign booth Phone canvassing Stick posters Convince friends Online campaigning Any canvassing # days canvassing
Panel A: Main effects
Any voice treatment 0.209∗∗ 0.057∗ 0.009 0.016 0.054∗ 0.007 0.021 0.336
(0.103) (0.030) (0.020) (0.029) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.344)
Panel B: Type of voice
Instrumental 0.240∗∗ 0.056 0.027 0.013 0.048 -0.014 0.034 0.252
(0.117) (0.035) (0.023) (0.034) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.393)
Intrinsic 0.178 0.057 -0.008 0.018 0.060∗ 0.028 0.007 0.420
(0.119) (0.035) (0.023) (0.034) (0.031) (0.030) (0.032) (0.416)
p(Instrumental = Intrinsic) 0.59 0.98 0.12 0.89 0.68 0.18 0.42 0.69
Panel C: Feedback announcement
Feedback announcement 0.277∗∗ 0.057 0.016 0.025 0.055∗ 0.019 0.017 0.077
(0.118) (0.035) (0.023) (0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.394)
No feedback announcement 0.145 0.056 0.003 0.007 0.052∗ -0.004 0.024 0.577
(0.117) (0.035) (0.023) (0.034) (0.032) (0.030) (0.032) (0.417)
p(Feedback = No feedback) 0.25 0.98 0.58 0.60 0.92 0.45 0.84 0.25
Control mean 2.42 0.56 0.12 0.39 0.70 0.47 0.31 2.24
Number of Observations 964 964 964 964 964 964 964 961
Notes: Table A7 presents the main treatment effects with control variables. Panel A displays pooled treatment
effects. Panel B displays heterogeneity by type of voice. Panel C displays heterogeneity by whether support-
ers saw the feedback announcement. Column (1) presents the effects on the number of planned campaign
activities. Columns (2) to (7) present impacts on the individual planned activities. Column (8) presents the
effects on the number of planned canvassing days. All regressions include the following control variables: age,
gender, membership dummy, years of party membership, above median perceived voice dummy, campaign
experience (dummies for all past activities), and z-scored expectations for the vote shares of the own party and
the two main competitors. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A8: Correlation of canvassing intentions and behavior by treatment status
Any door Doors (wins)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment Control Treatment Control
Intention: Any canvassing 0.079∗∗∗ 0.010 3.889∗∗∗ 0.317
(0.019) (0.010) (0.995) (0.316)
Group outcome mean 0.03 0.00 1.38 0.10
Number of Observations 672 335 672 335
p-value(control=treatment) 0.00 0.00
Notes: Table A8 presents the correlations between canvassing intentions and canvassing behavior by treatment
status. Columns (1) and (2) show correlations between canvassing intentions and a dummy for any canvassing
activity. Columns (3) and (4) show correlations between canvassing intentions and the number of canvassed
doors. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A9: Treatment effects on supporters’ perceptions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Voice index Diff through engagement Being heard Feels connection Party interested
Panel A: Main effects
Any voice treatment 0.082 0.092 0.041 0.084 0.041
(0.058) (0.061) (0.061) (0.064) (0.057)
Panel B: Type of voice
Instrumental 0.134∗∗ 0.123∗ 0.106 0.097 0.096
(0.066) (0.069) (0.072) (0.072) (0.068)
Intrinsic 0.030 0.062 -0.024 0.070 -0.013
(0.065) (0.070) (0.069) (0.074) (0.065)
p(Instrumental = Intrinsic) 0.09 0.35 0.07 0.69 0.11
Panel C: Feedback announcement
Feedback announcement 0.116∗ 0.105 0.069 0.092 0.100
(0.067) (0.071) (0.071) (0.072) (0.067)
No feedback announcement 0.050 0.080 0.015 0.076 -0.013
(0.064) (0.068) (0.070) (0.073) (0.065)
p(Feedback = No feedback) 0.28 0.70 0.44 0.82 0.09
Control mean -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
Number of Observations 955 955 955 955 955
Notes: Table A9 presents the treatment effects on supporters’ perceptions. Panel A displays pooled treatment
effects. Panel B displays heterogeneity by type of voice. Panel C displays heterogeneity by whether supporters
saw the feedback announcement. Column (1) shows treatment effects on a voice index. Columns (2) to (5)
show treatment effects on the index components. All specifications include the following control variables: age,
gender, membership dummy, years of party membership, above median perceived voice dummy, campaign
experience (dummies for all past activities), and z-scored expectations for the vote shares of the own party and
the two main competitors. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A10: Treatment effects on perceived campaign effectiveness
Effective campaign (z)
(1)
Panel A: Main effects
Any voice treatment -0.072
(0.068)





p(Instrumental = Intrinsic) 0.76
Panel C: Feedback announcement
Feedback announcement -0.074
(0.080)
No feedback announcement -0.071
(0.077)
p(Feedback = No feedback) 0.97
Control mean 0.00
Number of Observations 955
Notes: Table A10 presents the treatment effects on respondents’ perceptions of the effectiveness of the cam-
paign. Panel A displays pooled treatment effects. Panel B displays heterogeneity by type of voice. Panel
C displays heterogeneity by whether supporters saw the feedback announcement. Column (2) includes the
following control variables: age, gender, membership dummy, years of party membership, above median per-
ceived voice dummy, campaign experience (dummies for all past activities), and z-scored expectations for the
vote shares of the own party and the two main competitors. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A11: Effect of feedback on provided information - no control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Any comment Nonsense comment Constructive comment Length (characters)
Panel A: Type of voice
Instrumental 0.024 -0.021∗∗ 0.049 12.652
(0.039) (0.010) (0.037) (14.932)
Intrinsic group mean 0.50 0.03 0.36 98.16
Panel B: Feedback announcement
Feedback announcement 0.024 -0.008 0.008 39.356∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.010) (0.038) (14.945)
No feedback group mean 0.50 0.02 0.38 85.19
Number of Observations 672 672 672 672
Notes: Table A11 presents treatment effects on the extensive and intensive margins of provided comments.
Panel A shows the effects of type of voice. Panel B shows the effects of the feedback announcement. The pure
control group is not included as they were not asked for comments. Length of comment is winsorized at the
99th percentile. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A12: Effects on comment mood
Mood in comment
(1) (2)
Panel A: Type of voice
Instrumental -0.102∗∗ -0.087∗
(0.048) (0.048)
Intrinsic group mean 1.94 1.94
Panel B: Feedback announcement
Feedback announcement -0.015 -0.008
(0.048) (0.050)
No feedback group mean 1.90 1.90
Number of Observations 335 335
Controls X
Notes: Table A12 presents the treatment effects of the feedback treatment on the content of provided informa-
tion. Panel A shows the effects of type of voice. Panel B shows the effects of the feedback announcement. The
dependent variable is a categorical variable indicating the mood of the comment (1 being negative, 2 being
neutral, and 3 being positive). The pure control group is not included as they were not asked for feedback.
Column (2) includes the following control variables: age, gender, membership dummy, years of party mem-
bership, above median perceived voice dummy, campaign experience (dummies for all past activities), and
z-scored expectations for the vote shares of the own party and the two main competitors. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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A.1 Fully disaggregated regressions
Table A13: Balance table - disaggregated
Control Instrumental Instrumental + Feedback Intrinsic Intrinsic + Feedback p-value joint significance
Individual level characteristics
Female 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.22 0.80
Age 48.10 48.38 48.38 46.01 46.04 0.47
Years of party membership (winsorized) 15.12 14.63 17.10 15.22 16.19 0.55
Years of party membership (winsorized) 15.12 14.63 17.10 15.22 16.19 0.55
Perceived voice within party (1 - 5 Likert scale) 3.11 3.24 3.15 3.21 3.33 0.40
Expected vote share own party (z) 0.01 -0.07 -0.11 -0.14 -0.14 0.32
Expected vote share competitor party 1 (z) -0.00 0.04 0.01 0.04 -0.07 0.77
Expected vote share competitor party 2 (z) 0.00 -0.06 -0.16 0.07 -0.03 0.35
Prior experience
Any experience campaigning 0.77 0.75 0.83 0.76 0.78 0.43
Experience: door canvassing 0.49 0.46 0.59 0.52 0.51 0.19
Experience: # days door canvassing (winsorized) 13.79 10.31 12.88 15.37 16.19 0.45
Experience: sticking poster 0.59 0.65 0.68 0.59 0.63 0.32
Experience: campaign booth 0.70 0.64 0.76 0.66 0.70 0.14
Experience: social media 0.42 0.47 0.51 0.48 0.42 0.29
Experience: phone canvassing 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.21 0.88
Experience: convince friends 0.67 0.63 0.72 0.63 0.66 0.44
Experience: other 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.79
Notes: Table A13 presents a disaggregated balance table.
Table A14: Main treatment effects - disaggregated
App data Survey data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any Any Doors (wins) Doors (wins) Voice index (z) Voice index (z)
Treatment: instrumental 0.037∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 1.410∗∗ 1.452∗∗ 0.187∗∗ 0.130∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.694) (0.678) (0.092) (0.074)
Treatment: instrumental + feedback 0.022∗ 0.021∗ 1.442∗ 1.412∗ 0.165∗ 0.146∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.769) (0.774) (0.100) (0.084)
Treatment: intrinsic 0.015 0.014 0.766 0.639 0.003 -0.028
(0.011) (0.011) (0.565) (0.571) (0.099) (0.079)
Treatment: intrinsic + feedback 0.033∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 1.529∗∗ 1.293∗ 0.125 0.088
(0.015) (0.014) (0.775) (0.724) (0.095) (0.079)
Control mean 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.10 -0.00 -0.00
Number of Observations 1007 1007 1007 1007 955 955
Controls X X X
Notes: Table A14 presents the main treatment effects with control variables. Columns (1) to (4) show treatment
effects on canvassing behavior measured using the smartphone application. Columns (5) and (6) show the
impact on the voice index measured through the survey. Even columns include the following control vari-
ables: age, gender, membership dummy, years of party membership, above median perceived voice dummy,
campaign experience (dummies for all past activities), and z-scored expectations for the vote shares of the own
party and the two main competitors. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A15: Treatment effects on overall campaign activity - disaggregated
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
# activities Campaign booth Phone canvassing Stick posters Convince friends Online campaigning Any canvassing # days canvassing
Treatment: instrumental 0.225 0.045 0.004 0.009 0.066∗ -0.016 0.049 0.394
(0.139) (0.043) (0.027) (0.041) (0.038) (0.036) (0.039) (0.494)
Treatment: instrumental + feedback 0.270∗ 0.073∗ 0.054∗ 0.019 0.030 -0.008 0.017 0.009
(0.145) (0.042) (0.029) (0.043) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.507)
Treatment: intrinsic 0.074 0.071∗ 0.004 0.005 0.040 0.008 0.000 0.818
(0.147) (0.042) (0.029) (0.042) (0.039) (0.036) (0.040) (0.547)
Treatment: intrinsic + feedback 0.307∗∗ 0.047 -0.018 0.034 0.083∗∗ 0.046 0.022 0.286
(0.140) (0.043) (0.026) (0.042) (0.037) (0.038) (0.040) (0.473)
Control mean 2.42 0.56 0.12 0.39 0.70 0.47 0.31 2.24
Number of Observations 964 964 964 964 964 964 964 961
Notes: Table A15 presents the main treatment effects with control variables. Column (1) presents the effects on
the number of planned campaign activities. Columns (2) to (7) present impacts on the individual planned ac-
tivities. Column (8) presents the effects on the number of planned canvassing days. All regressions include the
following control variables: include age, gender, membership dummy, years of party membership, above me-
dian perceived voice dummy, campaign experience (dummies for all past activities), and z-scored expectations
for the vote shares of the own party and the two main competitors. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A16: Effect on perceptions- disaggregated
Voice index Diff through engagement Being heard Feels connection Party interested
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Treatment: instrumental 0.187∗∗ 0.126∗ 0.198∗∗ 0.140∗ 0.144 0.090 0.109 0.081 0.138 0.086
(0.092) (0.074) (0.089) (0.079) (0.098) (0.085) (0.089) (0.083) (0.096) (0.080)
Treatment: instrumental + feedback 0.165∗ 0.143∗ 0.144 0.105 0.129 0.124 0.161∗ 0.116 0.088 0.106
(0.100) (0.084) (0.099) (0.088) (0.103) (0.091) (0.089) (0.086) (0.105) (0.089)
Treatment: intrinsic 0.003 -0.026 0.053 0.019 -0.037 -0.061 0.084 0.072 -0.091 -0.114
(0.099) (0.078) (0.099) (0.083) (0.098) (0.087) (0.096) (0.090) (0.101) (0.081)
Treatment: intrinsic + feedback 0.125 0.090 0.156∗ 0.107 0.051 0.016 0.082 0.069 0.105 0.094
(0.095) (0.078) (0.095) (0.085) (0.095) (0.083) (0.093) (0.088) (0.093) (0.076)
Control mean -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
Number of Observations 955 955 955 955 955 955 955 955 955 955
Controls X X X X X
Notes: Table A16 presents the treatment effects on supporters’ perceptions. Columns (1) and (2) show treatment
effects on a voice index. Columns (3) to (10) show treatment effects on the index components. Even columns
include the following control variables: age, gender, membership dummy, years of party membership, above
median perceived voice dummy, campaign experience (dummies for all past activities), and z-scored expecta-
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Expected vote share own party
Expected vote share competitor party 1
Expected vote share competitor party 2
Experience: door canvassing









Prior voice (z) Voice index
Figure A1: Correlates of perceived voice
Notes: Figure A1 presents the regression coefficients of a regression of perceived voice (z-scored) on all available
pre-determined variables. All independent variables are standardized. Prior voice (z) is the standardized
measure of the question described in Figure 2. The voice index is an index of four questions measured after
treatment administration. The sample for the voice index regression is restricted to the control group. Bars
represent 95% confident intervals.
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Figure A2: Heterogeneous effects by prior voice
Notes: Figure A2 presents the impacts of the treatment by prior voice. High prior voice indicates above median
prior voice (the top two categories displayed in Figure 2). Panel A shows treatment effects on canvassing activ-
ity. Panel B shows impacts on the voice index. All available pre-determined variables are included as controls.
Bars represent 95% confident intervals. Stars indicate significance levels of a test of equality of treatment effects





we are conducting a short survey among our supporters to plan our election cam-
paign. Your participation helps us to use our campaign resources optimally. We
will treat your answers confidentially. The survey only takes 5 minutes.
Thank you very much for your help!
• Sex
What is your sex?
• Age
How old are you?
• Party member
Are you a member of [party name] party?
• Years of party membership (asked if respondent is party member)
For how many years have you been a member of [party name] party?
• Campaigning experience
Have you ever campaigned for the [party name] in the past?
• Prior campaigning experience: margins
In which election campaign activities have you participated at least once? Please
select all that apply.
Canvassing
Sticking posters
Participate in campaign booth
Online advertisements for the party (e.g. sharing campaign materials on social me-
dia)
Call supporters
Talk to family, friends and acquaintances about the [party name] election program
Other
• Canvassing: Intensive Margin
On how many days did you go from door to door for [party name] in the past?
• Canvassing workshop
Have you ever participated in a canvassing training workshop?
• Pre-treatment belief about voice
Do you feel that your opinion is heard within the party?
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• Perceived vote shares
What do you think: How many percent will the following parties receive in the





Your opinion is very important to us. We are particularly interested in which topics
seem important to you based on your experience in your constituency. We would
therefore like to ask you a few questions. Your answers help us to make the election
campaign more effective.




Work and social policies
Digitization
Education and Research
Budget, Finance and Taxes
Foreign Policy and Security Policy
Would you like to tell us more about which issues we should particularly empha-
size in the election campaign? [open-text box]
• Treatment: Instrumental + Feedback
Your opinion is very important to us. We are particularly interested in which topics
seem important to you based on your experience in your constituency. We would
therefore like to ask you a few questions. Your answers help us to make the election
campaign more effective.
After the completion of the survey, we will send you a summary of the results.
What do you think: How much should we emphasize the following issues in the




Work and social policies
Digitization
Education and Research
Budget, Finance and Taxes
Foreign Policy and Security Policy
Would you like to tell us more about which issues we should particularly empha-
size in the election campaign? After the completion of the survey, we will send you
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a summary of the results. [open-text box]
• Treatment: Intrinsic
Your opinion is very important to us. We are particularly interested in which topics
are close to your heart. We would therefore like to ask you a few questions.
How much do you personally care about the following topics?




Work and social policies
Digitization
Education and Research
Budget, Finance and Taxes
Foreign Policy and Security Policy
Would you like to tell us more about which topics are particularly close to your
heart? [open-text box]
• Treatment: Intrinsic + Feedback
Your opinion is very important to us. We are particularly interested in which topics
are close to your heart. We would therefore like to ask you a few questions.
After the completion of the survey, we will send you a summary of the results.
How much do you personally care about the following topics?




Work and social policies
Digitization
Education and Research
Budget, Finance and Taxes
Foreign Policy and Security Policy
Would you like to tell us more about which topics are particularly close to your
heart? After the completion of the survey, we will send you a summary of the
results. [open-text box]
• Intended campaigning experience: margins
How do you intend to contribute to the current election campaign?
Canvassing
Sticking posters
Participate in campaign booth
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Online advertisements for the party (e.g. sharing campaign materials on social me-
dia)
Call supporters
Talk to family, friends and acquaintances about the [partyname] election program
Other
• Intensive margin (asked if extensive margin is yes)
On how many days do you plan to canvass during this election campaign?
• Post-treatment beliefs
To what extent do you agree with each of the following statements?
I can make a difference through my involvement in [partyname].
I feel connected to [partyname].
My opinion is being taken into account to improve the party’s election campaign.
I have the feeling that [partyname] is interested in my opinion.
The [partyname] has an effective campaigning strategy.
• Debrief Thank you very much for your participation
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